Introduction
Why did humans turn out so different from the animal with whom they share a common ancestor, the chimpanzee? Ever since Darwin many have sought an explanation for our divergent anatomy, behaviour, and state of consciousness within a framework of evolutionary thinking. To understand human evolution one must, besides biological selection pressures, also take relatively new sociocultural and technological factors into account. But how do all these factors tie in together? The 1 tradition of philosophical anthropology seeks answers to this question by combining findings and formulating theories based on evidence from evolutionary biology and etiology, phenomenology, cultural and structural anthropology, paleontology, archeology, linguistics, psychology and philosophy. All these disciplines seek to explain certain elements of the human (extended) phenotype 1 , and to understand the path by which such a novel way of being in the world could come to exist.
In his books 'Nicht gerettet: Versuche nach Heidegger ' (2001) and the 'Sphären' ('spheres') trilogy (originally published in 1998, 1999, and 2004) philosopher Peter Sloterdijk has gathered together ideas from several contributors to the tradition of philosophical anthropology to embark on a 'fantastic reconstruction' (Sloterdijk 2001, p.169 , my translation) of our coming to be. A 'sphere' stands for the social, cultural and technological environment that humans build for themselves, and that isolates them from the natural environment that is typical for wild animals like the chimpanzee. Buffered from the demands of nature, humans become ever more tuned to the demands of their artificial environments, and become ever less likely to be able to survive and thrive in natural circumstances. How to understand this process of change? How to reconstruct this evolutionary history? From theories handpicked and combined from many disciplines and many thinkers, Sloterdijk converges on four synergistic mechanisms that, in combination, are responsible for the divergent evolution of humans: group-internal criteria for selection, the unburdening of the body through technology, a tendency towards 'neoteny' (a delayed and prolonged juvenile stage), and 'transference', the (re-)generation of self-created 'spheres' in space and time. None of these mechanisms works independently, and combined they form what he calls the 'anthropogenetic mechanism' -the mechanism responsible for having 'produced' modern humans.
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For Sloterdijk the central role in human evolution is for technology. For him, all technology is spherical 'Brutkast/hothouse' technology 2 , and ipso facto all technology, in an indirect way, is gene technology (Sloterdijk 2001, p.197) , or genetic manipulation. It is the sum of all these techniques that he calls 'anthropotechnology', a term that embraces both 'hard' technologies (like the 'lithotechnology' of stone tools) and symbolic or 'soft' technologies (like language, or cultural rules of behaviour). It is anthropotechnology that has produced the modern human being.
The human being is a being that is profoundly technological, unnatural, and meta-biological, but it is still biological as well. Will we find evidence for Sloterdijk's anthropogenetic mechanisms (even) in our DNA? Inclusion of evidence from molecular biology and genetics to understand human nature is rather new tothe tradition of philosophical anthropology. But today the new field of comparative genomics, where the full sequences of DNA of different organisms are confronted with each other in order to find differences and similarities present in entire genomes, gives access to new relevant evidence that is worth exploring, and new research fields are starting to blossom, like molecular anthropology and bioarcheology. This paper represents a similar approach to investigate the fit of new, empirical, genomic data in the, until very recently, genomically uninformed theoretical framework of philosophical anthropology, or rather, an attempt to test this approach, using the theoretical framework of one of its current representatives, Peter Sloterdijk. Besides using the genomic data to inform the humanities, existing theories such as Sloterdijk's can also inform biological sciences like genomics by helping to direct the gaze to retrieve the sort of information from genomic data that can help our understanding of our evolution.
The approach in this paper will be to first elaborate on the four synergistic, anthropogenic mechanisms that Sloterdijk proposes. Next, the outcome of the genomic comparison of humans and chimpanzees will be discussed. What salient phenotypic differences correspond to underlying 3 genetic differences? In the discussion the implications of these findings for Sloterdijk's theory will be evaluated. Does the genomic evidence corroborate the theory that an anthropogenic mechanism is (co-)shaping the human species? To what extent? Independent of the answer to this question, another question will need to be addressed: how are we to understand the 'freedom' and the 'evolutionary plasticity' of humans that is central to Sloterdijk's theory? For so much is evident: humans are a special case in evolutionary history.
New mechanisms for human evolution? Four synergistic mechanisms
In his search for anthropogenetic mechanisms for human evolution Sloterdijk was not interested in explaining the difference in the body or behaviour of humans compared to the other primates , but rather the different way of 'being in the world' of the human being. His work is an effort to get an improved grasp on Heidegger's notion of 'Lichtung' (Heidegger 2002) , the 'world' humans live in. 3 Sloterdijk goes on a journey to retrace the evolution, or rather, the 'production', of what
Heidegger wrongly takes as a given and a starting point: the human being. How did the original ape come to be human? When, how, why, where and to whom could the 'Lichtung' appear? It is in search of an answer to this question that Sloterdijk sets out to describe anthropogenetic mechanisms. Unlike Heidegger, Sloterdijk emphasizes the bodily aspect of what it means to be human (Verbeek 2008) . But it is not the human being as a biological species that he seeks to understand. It might, therefore, be considered a bit farfetched to confront Sloterdijk's theory with genomic and other biological data. Still, it is worthwhile to proceed with the chosen approach and answer the question whether the evolution of the biological human is profoundly influenced by the aforementioned anthropogenetic mechanisms, and if so, how human biology is affected by them.
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None of the four synergetic mechanisms work independently, and combined they have 'produced' the human being of today (Sloterdijk 2001 reports that in humans a lot of variation on a molecular (DNA) level, 84%, is 'selection neutral' variation, and that only 16% is adaptive in the natural sense and/or in a 'race-and ethnic sense'; a mixed adaptation to the geographical environment and to local culture. 5 However, the genomes of other organisms also house a lot of neutral genetic variation (Orr 2009 This is especially the case with adaptive behaviour, but also works through copying the devices that support the superiority of the 'luckiest' during one's lifetime. If an (artificially supported) phenotypic capacity gives rise to the sort of flexible response that amounts to a cultural adaptation, then in recurrent circumstances genotypes that support phenotypes that can make further use of opportunities in (ever more) artificial environments will also start to fall under 'oldfashioned' selection pressures. In this process of co-evolution, 'sphere'-related trait variants can also start spreading through the population genetically. For Sloterdijk, this explains why our physical appearance (think of our skin, our hands, our face, our brain, and the womanly form, to name a few examples) and behaviour have come to differ so much from that of our closest animal relation, the chimpanzee. There is a Lamarckian, or rather, Baldwinian touch to Sloterdijk's train of thought that is controversial, and that I will address later on. But importantly, what Sloterdijk also tries to say is that the biased transmission of certain gene variants is not the only way to evolve in techno-cultural 'spheres'. 'Fitness' is not only about the number of genetic offspring any more.
The second anthropogenetic mechanism is that of the 'unburdening' of the body. 6 Sloterdijk places the start of this development at the time where humans started to make use of stones as tools, a defining moment where humans started taking matters into their own hands. Hands were shaped by this early 'paw-work'. But not only our hands adapted to tool use; also new and more 6 complex ways of thinking were jumpstarted by the first putting to use of stones as projectiles to stave off predators and competitors around 5 million years ago, at the beginning of our hominid line (Young 2003) . 7 The 'Homo technologicus' appears. The subsequent exploration of new possibilities of transfer of the burden of many types of hard work to tools, and in a later stage to machines and symbols, has allowed for a 'drift towards 'luxuriation'' (Sloterdijk 2001, p.188, my translation) . The human being is the 'Luxus-animal', defined not by hardships, but by comforts.
In biology, the concept of 'drift' refers to chance (non-selected) changes in frequencies of gene variants that may turn out neutral, beneficial, or detrimental to reproductive success. Where in the other primates many bodily traits and behaviours similar to ours are shaped and 'kept in check' by the selection pressures of their natural environment, in humans some of these traits are 'liberated'
and might drift towards disappearance 8 or redeployment through change in a new adaptive sense.
'Luxuriation' is therefore tied to the opening up of a space of variation or 'evolutionary plasticity', which under the influence of group-internal criteria evolved in the direction of esthetic and cognitive traits. This is reflected, for example, in the fast development of the relatively large human brain. Here, according to Sloterdijk, the brain starts a 'luxuration' in which it almost seems to be hurrying ahead, mysteriously building a potential for achieving matters that are far beyond of what is asked of it at that time. 9 Currently, there are differen hypotheses as to why humans have developed such a big brain, which cite coping with social complexity in large groups, the planning of manual actions, sexual selection, or memetic selection as the trigger for this development. 10 For Sloterdijk, all these elements could play a role, and interactively so, as social relations, sexual preferences, tool production and tool use, and the symbolic power of language all represent 'soft' and 'hard' anthropotechnologies at work to produce human beings in the 'anthropotope' or 'sphere'.
Third, Sloterdijk describes a process that has resulted in 'neoteny'. 11 The increase of brain and skull volume (due to the abovementioned opened up possibility of 'luxuriation') causes the human child to be born in a premature state, before the skull becomes too big and too little pliant to move through the birth canal without damaging the mother. The necessary mother-child 'symbiosis' after birth is supported by the 'group hothouse' that functions as an 'external uterus' (Sloterdijk 2001, p.190, my translation) . The tendencies for cerebral growth and early birth got locked in a circular causation pattern, resulting in babies that, when compared on a level of development scale to our cousin the chimpanzee, are born a year too soon. Also, human beings reach adulthood only quite late, giving them, in general, a 'fetal image', which is likely to depend on changed endocrinological (hormonal) and chronobiological (timing) mechanisms (of which we would expect some genetic evidence in a genome-wide comparison with the chimpanzee).
Associated developments may have been the loss of body hair, the development of the thin human skin, development of the human eye, and of course the further development of the human brain and its receptivity to learning, and the development of speech. Sloterdijk calls the newly developed organs the 'organs of the 'Lichtung'' (Sloterdijk 2001, p.195, my translation) , by which he means to say that they have more than just biological functions: they are metabiological. They turn humans into beings that can relate to the world in a fashion 'beyond biology'.
The vulnerable state of the dependent human infant (and also of the adolescent and adult human that remain to a large extent dependent upon their 'sphere') creates the necessity of a continuous, unrelenting upkeep of the created 'hothouse' or 'sphere'. It is in this activity that Sloterdijk recognizes a polarity that typifies human nature. On the one hand, man is an 'animal of luxury'
that enjoys an environment adapted to its needs (and wishes), but on the other hand he has to work continuously to keep that environment intact and functional, a life of preventing and caring 8 for, or, in short, of constant worry. It is after 'hominization', which occurs in the period of the discovery of stone tools and the evolution of the brain and the hands for tool use (and subsequent refinement of the tools, etc.), that the upkeep of the 'sphere' becomes more and more important.
This leads to a new selective process of 'culture competition' (Sloterdijk 2001, p.191 Based on Sloterdijk's synergistic mechanisms one would reach the conclusion that in human evolution natural selection has become, more and more, overshadowed by a cultural process of change. But is there any way of knowing to what extent the evolution of the human organism has become 'uncoupled' from old-fashioned natural selection? Is there biological evidence that 9
Sloterdijk's four mechanisms are a driving force behind human evolution? The best available approach at this moment to see if there is evidence for a complex of anthropogenetic mechanisms impacting on our biology at the level of DNA is to compare the complete genome of Homo sapiens to the complete genome of our closest kin in the animal world, Pan troglodytes, or the chimpanzee.
Genome-wide comparison of Homo sapiens and Pan troglodytes
The first question that genome-wide comparisons cleared up was that of the relationship between human, gorilla, and chimpanzee. Although humans have only 46 chromosomes and gorillas and chimpanzees have 48 (human chromosome 2 is apparently a fusion of ape chromosomes 12 and 13), humans and chimpanzees share identical inversions on chromosomes 7 and 8 that are not in the gorilla chromosomes, making humans and chimpanzees sister taxa, and gorillas the 'odd ape out' (Bradley 2008) . Gorillas split off about 6-10 million years ago, and humans and chimpanzees split off from their last common ancestor about 5 million years ago. Pre-modern Homo taxa with obligate walking on two feet and medium-sized brains appear in the fossil record 1.9 million years ago, and modern Homo sapiens and (now extinct) Homo neanderthalensis 200,000 years ago (Wood 2008) .
There is evidence that a single recent origin of modern humans in East Africa has replaced all other hominin forms (Sykes 2001) , which means that we are all descendants of one small community of 1,000-10,000 individuals around 50-60,000 years ago. Geneticist Luigi CavalliSforza (2001) was the first to suggest that humans underwent a series of successive 'population bottlenecks' while expanding out over the globe in small groups. Such a 'bottleneck' is caused by an event (often a natural disaster) that decimates a population and leaves only a small group to reproduce, offering an explanation for the phylo-geographic distribution of human diversity.
These bottlenecks may have been one of the reasons behind the finding that there is more genetic variability in a single chimpanzee community (chimps having maintained a steady population number over time) than in a global sampling of humans. More surprising, perhaps, was the discovery that most variation in humans lies within, rather than between, populations (Bradley 2008 ).
What has surprised (and even shocked) many is that we share with chimpanzees almost all of our genes and 98.8% of our DNA (or rather, 96%, if one includes differences in duplications, insertions and deletions, which, we shall see, are increasingly thought of as significant differences). Something special is going on, because, for example, in species of mice identical in 98% of their DNA the phenotypes do not differ as much (Bradley 2008) . Therefore, indications are that, more than to modifications of the genes themselves, changes in the regulation of genes are likely to cause many of the differences between modern humans and chimpanzees.
In 2009, physician-scientist Ajit Varki 12 and his colleague Tasha Altheide listed many phenotypic traits for comparison with those of great apes. Covering many categories, the list does not only contain phenotypic differences that are obvious to any discerning human eye, like anatomical, behavioural, and life cycle differences, but also differences at organ-, tissue-, and molecular levels 13 , as well as differences in cognitive capacity, communication, social organization, and culture. Varki and Altheide point out that a major limitation of translating genomic comparative information into an understanding of 'humanness' is the relative lack of knowledge about the basic phenotypic features of the great apes.
Of the many items on Varki's categorized list, (Pollard 2009 The genomic comparison shows that it is likely to be rather impossible to elucidate which genes (and other genomic but non-protein-coding regions) play a role in the behavioural phenotype and cultural expressions of the human species. A point of oversight that Varki mentions is the poverty of information regarding the 'phenome' of the compared species, meaning 'the body of information describing an organism's phenotype under the influences of genetic and environmental factors' (Varki & Nelson 2007, my emphasis) . It should also be noted that these are early results. Findings might be due to incomplete coverage of the chimpanzee genome, or intra-specific variation in the genomes of different individuals, for example differences in gene copy number (Bradley, 2008) .
What nevertheless becomes obvious is that an idea of evolution depending only on spontaneous single base pair mutations that cause changes in protein functionalities that can sometimes confer a relative fitness advantage is simplistic and incomplete. Linking candidate genes to phenotypic traits is only one way to understand human evolution, a top-down approach. Using bioinformatics tools, it has become possible to take a bottom-up approach to lay bare all the genomic differences, without any understanding yet of their meaning. Important differences in the DNA sequence are those that cause protein changes, regulatory changes, or changes that occur due to gene loss and/or gene duplications (Bradley 2008 ).
Protein changes can occur when mutations in the base sequence of a gene are positively selected for and get fixated in the population that way. With the use of bioinformatics genomes can be compared and scanned for genes that have undergone accelerated evolution. The genes found are involved in smell, hearing, and include candidate genes for controlling skull and brain size (Aspm and Mcph1), genes involved in skin biology, and a gene (FoxP2) (see also Table 1 ) that, when mutated, is associated with speech disorder and speech understanding (of which it must be noted that this protein is a transcription factor that regulates the transcription of several other genes).
Other genes with links to different phenotypic traits that cannot be discerned by the eye, and for that reason may have escaped Sloterdijk's attention (and a listing in Table 1 ), are those involved immune defence, cell signalling, and amino acid metabolism. Changes at this level can have an impact on the development of other ('downstream') phenotypic traits, which could mean that these other traits were not directly selected for, but are a by-product of change at the more basic level. It is interesting to note that the number of positively selected genes in general is smaller in humans than in chimpanzees, despite a higher non-synonymous base pair substitution rate in humans (Bakewell 2007) . Even genes for the brain seem not to have undergone accelerated evolution. On the contrary: chimpanzees accumulated more changes in brain-specific gene sequences (Shi et al. 2008) .
16
Another genetic factor of influence on a resulting phenotype is the level of gene expression. Cells in different bodily tissues contain the same DNA; therefore, the different phenotype of the different tissues must depend on differential DNA expression. Microarray studies can compare the expression levels of thousands of genes from samples of human and chimpanzee body tissues at the same time. One result shows an upward regulation of genes expressed in the human brain.
But it must be noted that human and chimpanzee gene expression profiles also differ much in the liver, so the meaning of found patterns is not straightforwardly clear (Bradley 2008) . Besides an upward regulation of gene expression levels there is also evidence that the brain 'transcriptome'
(the brain's complete set of RNA molecules) is remodelled during brain development after birth.
These changes result in a developmental retardation, or 'neoteny', when compared to brains of other primates (Somel et al. 2009 ).
Still another way of looking for important differences is to look closely at conserved regions in the genome, thought to 'have undergone purifying selection' which might indicate functional importance, meaning that any mutation in that sequence would only lessen functionality. Of the 35,000 regions of DNA sequence conserved in mice, rats and chimpanzees, 49 were markedly different in humans and were called HARs (Human Accelerated Regions). Only two of the HAR regions code for proteins. The other 47 are likely to be regulatory regions: non-protein coding stretches of DNA to which , for example, transcription factors could bind to activate a cascade of genetic transcription. One of the regulatory regions, HAR1, may play an important role in the development of important neurological pathways. (Pollard 2009; . HAR2 may be involved in thumb and wrist development; of the other HARs not much is known yet.
Interestingly, HAR1 has no protein-coding sequence but only makes RNA transcripts. This fits in with the growing appreciation in biological science that species-specific changes may be more easily conferred through changes of regulatory RNA molecules, which could affect many targets on the route from genotype to phenotype (Varki & Nelson 2007) .
A third of the gene duplications in the human genome seem to be human-specific. An example is Duf1220, of which humans carry 212 copies and chimpanzees only 37, and which is expressed at high levels in brain regions associated with higher cognitive function (Bradley 2008 In the reviews used here another type of epigenetic regulation is being ignored that currently is getting more and more attention. The regulated addition of acetyl molecules 16 to histones, the protein material in which DNA is packaged, creates room for the molecular machinery that transcribes DNA into RNA to bind. The integration of epigenetic chromatin tags into a fine-tuned transcriptional response is called the 'histone code' (Levenson & Sweatt 2005) . The attachment of small methyl molecules to DNA directly, on the other hand, can 'silence' a gene by keeping it from being expressed. A study in adults born shortly after a winter of hunger in the Second World War showed that DNA-methylation patterns can change during the development of a foetus. This epigenetic adaptation is triggered in the foetus by stress signals coming from the mother's body (Heijmans et al. 2008) . The acquired pattern can be inherited by the offspring of this child, and persist for a few generations, even when the stressful conditions no longer exist. Variations in chromatin acetylation and DNA-methylation can influence rates of mutation, transposition, and recombination of DNA. This can provide a bias for change in the DNA sequence (Jablonka & Lamb, 2008) . It may provide an explanation for the tendency of the Human Accelerated Regions (HARs) to have biased patterns of DNA nucleotide substitutions (Berglund et al. 2009 ).
Interpreting the genomic data in the light of anthropogenetic mechanisms
So do the data from genome-wide comparisons fit with Sloterdijk's theory? Do they provide evidence that the four interferential 'anthropogenetic mechanisms' are in play in human evolution, and if so, to what extent? Let's start with Sloterdijk's first anthropogenic mechanism, 'insulation' from natural selection or 'group-internal criteria', which supposedly 'freed the evolutionary plasticity' of humans. From the genomic data it is obvious that the phenotypic differences between humans and chimpanzees are, at first sight, much more striking than their genotypic differences: 96% of their DNA sequence is identical. And for all the human phenotypic variation that is going on, the chimpanzees have more variation in their genes, and show more evidence of positive selection pressures on gene variants. 'Phenotypic plasticity' therefore does not necessarily translate to variability in protein-coding sequences. There are also other ways to vary genetically: the same unchanged genes and/or other genetic sequences may be copied, or no longer used at all, or 'redeployed' somehow to perform different functions. As biologist and philosopher Lenny Moss has put it, at issue is not whether changes in genome structure are could offer an alternative explanation for found differences. Also, the comparison (apart from the added non-protein coding HARs) says nothing of differences at the epigenetic level, a level now considered crucial to explaining phenotypic outcome and perhaps the reason for the lack of candidate genetic sequences for many of the traits on the list.
According to Sloterdijk's second anthropogenetic mechanism it was anthropotechnology that 'unburdened' the human body of many of the demands a natural environment would have made on it, and that allowed the 'drift' towards esthetic and cognitive traits that later met present groupinternal criteria. In time these criteria caused the spontaneously emerging traits to come to fall under 'spherical' selection pressures, which could ultimately lead to these traits finding some type of genetic fixation. This idea follows the logic of the 'Baldwin effect', an idea proposed by James In his third anthropogenetic mechanism Sloterdijk speaks again of a 'drift', driven by the initial response to increase brain size, towards 'neoteny'. McKinney (1998) contests this and claims that human beings do not show arrested development of the brain, but rather over-development. 18 In domesticated dogs, where arrested development of the brain does take place during late fetal development, one can speak of juvenalization (compared to wolves, dogs stay juvenile all their life), not in humans. The 'fetal image' given off by the lack of body hair and the 'baby face' is just a coincidence. But human babies, compared to other primates, are born three months too soon. The evidence of Somel et al. (2009) that the brain transcriptome is remodelled after birth, resulting in a developmental retardation, speaks in favour of Sloterdijk's mechanism. After birth the human brain continues to develop for a far longer time than in other primates in the prolonged period of youth and adolescence. One would expect to find genetic evidence changes in genes involved in controlling hormone levels or of genes involved in now retarded and prolonged development, but under the heading of 'life history' we find no differences in genetic sequences linked to neoteny. But perhaps one should not expect genetic evidence if neoteny is more about changes in gene regulation and in regulation at the level of RNA and protein activity that have an impact on hormone production than about changes in singular genes.
Crucial to understanding the fourth mechanism is the notion that the 'sphere' is kept up by culture and technology, and the fact that the evolutionary process has changed for humans -having transferred some emphasis away from their bodily evolution to the evolution of their anthropotechnology first, and the body second. Also, consider the resultant (partial) uncoupling from the old concept of fitness: large numbers of offspring are no longer a driver for the direction this evolution will take. Rather than fixating adaptations genetically through higher numbers of offspring, the transient character of the artificially supported and quite sudden increase of the human population plus the exceptional cultural and ecological changes give rise to an increase in the rate and effectiveness of adaptation (Hawks et al. 2007 ). In our evolutionary state of disequilibrium, many avenues can be explored. What is striking about the human organism, in this scenario, is the rate at which our 'evolvability' evolves. It is this type of adaptation that Sloterdijk urges us to consider when he speaks of 'plasticity' and 'freedom' at a genetic level.
Biologists should not (only) be looking at the positively selected genes of a previous age, but at our reservoir of genetic variety and at biological ways that have evolved to access that resource. It is the evolution of new kinds of adaptability in the context of the 'sphere' that Sloterdijk wants to emphasize.
Discussion
Triggered by Sloterdijk's suggestion that all anthropotechnology, directly or indirectly, is gene technology, this study set out to see if an impact of our 'anthropotechnological' evolutionary history can be found in our genetic 'record'. The twentieth century has been called 'the century of the gene': all attention was focused on finding and understanding protein-coding genes, and on understanding evolution in terms of spontaneous variations in these genes and the selection of gene variants that provided an advantage, however small, in terms of fitness. And a few of such genes have been found in the performed genomic comparison: genes correlated with increased skull size, jaw musculature, skin and hair, the capacity to digest lactose, and a gene that is involved in our capacity for speech. Clearly, these genetic differences fit in with Sloterdijk's idea 
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elements that cause the transference of pieces of sequence throughout the genome. These are quite different mechanisms from spontaneous point mutations, and provide a lot of variation, presumably often selection-neutral variation, that could also provide novel material for evolutionary processes of the Baldwinian type. Still considered unthinkable until late in the previous century (e.g. Gould, 1980) , the idea of considering genomes as being complex, integrated, and dynamic is picking up now (Shapiro 2005 At the level of epigenetics adaptation takes place in a fast 'mode' (Gluckman et al. 2009 ).
Epigenetic patterns are sensitive to the experiences of an organism during its lifetime, and can be inheritable. Considering that our 'sphere' continues to evolve at an accelerated pace, it seems safe to assume that this impacts on our epigenetic flexibility. As epigenetic patterns may bias genetic change, it becomes easier to see how our anthropotechnological environment could have very 24 profound effects on the course of our organismal evolution. With an integrated, dynamic genome and the responsive capacity of the epigenetic level in mind, the original research question would need to be recast: Has anthropotechnology supported new routes of (epi-)genetic exploration unique to the human species? Or is the human (epi-)genome, in that respect, not fundamentally different when compared to other animals?
Adaptation can take place at yet another level that falls outside of the scope of this study. It is also in the anthropotechnology itself that information about the generation of a well-adapted human being is preserved. Focusing on 'hard' anthropotechnologies, philosopher Bernard Stiegler considers the use of technology as a sort of external memory that is unique to humankind (Stiegler 1994) . He sees it as a third memory of 'organized anorganic matter' or 'epi-phylogenetic memory' that exists next to our genetic and epigenetic inheritance. 19 Obviously, the technological artefacts can evolve much faster than humans can. Humans may be the source of 'mutations' (variations) in these artefacts, but in the co-evolution of human and technology it is the technology that 'leads', evolving outside of human biology (Lemmens 2008 ). This logic also holds for 'soft' anthropotechnologies (like cultural rules of behaviour).
Conclusion
As our evolution takes place at different levels and at different rates, understanding itour evolution turns out to be far more complex than previously thought. The impact of anthropotechnology on our evolution cannot be assessed by genomic comparisons only. Although some evidence for an impact of an 'anthropotechnological' evolutionary history was found in our genes, the research highlighted the limitations of a genetic comparative approach. Evolutionary significant differences cannot only be found in changed genes, but also in changed genome architectures and dynamics, epigenetic patterns, and 'epi-phylogenetic memory'. This paper has 25 considered some ways in which changes at one level may impact on other levels. It strongly challenges old-fashioned 'gene-centered' views and the inclination in our society towards 'genetic reductionism'.
Sloterdijk's central observation that the creation of 'spheres', starting with the creation of the first stone tools and houses, has 'freed the evolutionary plasticity of the inhabitants of these weird spaces' and provided a starting point for the creation of humanity, turns out to be an observation of great interest. Philosophical anthropological work like Sloterdijk's, which admittedly has its own flaws, nevertheless provides a perspective that cannot be dismissed and from which one can arrive at new research questions.
There is reason to believe that the impact of anthropotechnology on our evolution, relatively subtle (although still rather impressive) in the last two million years, has been growing and will continue to increase. A better understanding of this phenomenon, obtained by interdisciplinary research, will be necessary to guide us, as we reach an increased awareness of our own roles and responsibilities in this process of change. ' (1964) . Both works show that this mechanism is already relevant in the evolution of certain animals. 
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The unprecedented capacity to perform the unusual, coordinated, exceedingly rapid, sequential series of the movements of throwing and swinging has become part of the normal human developmental sequence. The theory that Sloterdijk invokes here is the 'chimpanzee-thrower-scavenger-warrior' model of human evolution of Eduard Kirchmann (Das Zeitalter der Werfer, Hannover, 1999).
8 Genes underlying traits that are no longer necessary might accumulate spontaneous mutations that, in time, could inactivate them and cause 'gene loss'. Since there is no selection pressure to act on them, this has no consequences for the relative fitness of the organism, and the process falls under 'neutral evolution'.
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Not often mentioned in these discussions is the fact that in the past 20,000 years and particularly the past 10,000 years, body size shrank a little bit, and brain size shrank quite a lot (Zorich, 2008) , about 8-10%.
